Abstract. Increasing health care costs in the United States, and the factors contributing to them, are strongly debated issues among academics and policy makers. Among these factors, technological change in medicine has been widely regarded as the primary driver of cost growth. However, one factor that has been largely ignored in the literature and ought to be considered an open question is the e ect of increased competition among HMOs on hospital competition. This paper di erentiates between two notions of the e ects of managed care on hospital technology: i HMOs discourage the adoption of technology by all hospitals, and ii HMOs rationalize the adoption of technology in hospitals. These notions are di erentiated by stating competing hypotheses regarding the e ect of HMO penetration and the e ect of HMO competition on a hospital's probability to adopt, as well as the time to the rst and follow-on adoptions in a given hospital market. Data from 1985-1995 on cardiac catheterization laboratories from all short term general community hospitals, and data on HMO penetration and competition, yield results consistent with the traditional medical arms race literature. Further, the results show that whereas HMO penetration does not e ect the probability of adoption, a hospital is more likely to adopt cardiac catheterization facilities as the competition within HMOs increases. The results also indicate that the probability of follow-on adoption in a local hospital market initially increases as the HMO market becomes increasingly competitive, but eventually starts decreasing. If the results reported here are typical of other expensive technologies as well, then it implies that as HMO competition increases, so does duplication of technology. This in turn can lead to a faster growth in the health care costs.
Introduction
Health policy analysts have pointed to technological change as the main reason for rising health care costs in the U.S. Newhouse, 1992; Weisbrod, 1991; Baumgardner, 1991; Aaron, 1991 . The early and duplicative adoption of technology by hospitals, as explained by the medical arms race literature, led to initiatives that directly controlled the adoption and di usion of technology at the state level. The 1974 National Health Planning and Resources Act limited Medicare capital payments to those facilities that obtained approval by planners to acquire new capital. The popularity of this regulation, called Certi cate of Need CON, dwindled during the Reagan years and many states abandoned the CON laws in the mid-1980s. The ine ectiveness of the CON laws Salkever & Bice, 1976; Sloan & Steinwald, 1980; Joskow, 1981 to reduce the di usion of technology or costs has given way to more market oriented approaches, speci cally the growth of health maintenance organizations HMOs.
It is believed that HMOs foster price competition among hospitals, thereby reducing early and duplicative technology and hence costs. Indeed, research has shown that since the breakthrough enactment of selective contracting in the California legislature in 1982 and other states since then the growth in HMOs has had a positive e ect on reducing non-price competition Baker & Spetz, 1999; Cutler & Sheiner, 1997; Cutler & McClellan, 1996 and increasing price-competition among hospitals Melnick & Zwanziger, 1988; Melnick et al., 1989a Melnick et al., , 1992 Zwanziger et al., 1994 . The latter e ect has been stronger in more competitive hospital markets, thereby also indicating that the growth in HMOs may have checked the medical arms race as well.
Advocates of managed care argue that selective contracting and utilization review alter hospital and physician incentives to use costly technologies and services. If so, the growth of HMOs would be associated with a slower di usion of technology. On the other hand, McLaughlin 1988 cautions that selective contracting might not substitute all forms of non-price competition and that in fact the market response to HMOs may lead to increased non-price competition among providers. However, empirical research on this subject is very limited. Further, what is lacking even at the theoretical level, is a debate on the e ect of increased competition among HMOs. Speci cally, when HMO markets become more competitive, will the HMOs lose weaken their ability to alter provider incentives for the use of costly procedures? More to the point, given that evidence suggests that the growth of HMOs penetration and enrollment is associated with increased price competition among providers, will increased competition among HMOs lead to an increase in price competition or an increase in non-price competition among providers?
The answers to these questions have important policy implications: If increased competition among HMOs reduces the duplication of expensive technologies, then state HMO laws that foster greater competition would help in slowing the health care costs. If, on the other hand, increased competition among HMOs leads to a greater proliferation and duplication of expensive technologies in local markets, then policy makers may need to target optimal levels of HMO pentration and competition. Optimal levels would beneeded to balance the bene ts of increased price competition among hospitals due to the growth in HMOs Melnick & Zwanziger, 1988; Melnick et al., 1989a Melnick et al., , 1992 Zwanziger et al., 1994 versus the high costs of duplicating expensive technology.
To answer these questions, I test hypotheses from two competing theories, that HMOs discourage the adoption of technologies by all hospitals versus that HMOs rationalize the adoption of technologies. Speci cally, using data on cardiac catheterization laboratories henceforth cathlabs, from the American Hospital Association AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals and market-level data on HMO market penetration and competition from 1985 to 1996, I test the following hypothesis:
Increased penetration by HMOs will reduce the probability of rst and follow-on adoption by hospitals. In markets where technology is still di using, greater HMO competition will decrease the probability of rst adoption by hospitals.
In markets where technology is still di using, greater HMO competition will decrease the probability of follow-on adoption by hospitals. In markets where the technology is already di used, increased HMO competition will reduce the probability of follow-on adoption by hospitals. The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides basic information on cardiac catheterization, how expensive it is to adopt the technology as well as some general trends in adoption patterns over the last two decades. Section 3 reviews relevant literature on hospital technology and managed care. Section 4 discusses the theory, lays out testable hypotheses and provides an econometric speci cation. This is followed by a description of the data, results from the analysis and discussion on these results in section 5. The last section, section 6, provides conclusions and summarizes the discussion.
2. Cardiac Catheterization 2.1. What is cardiac catheterization? Cardiac catheterization is a procedure which can be diagnostic or therapeutic. It is generally recommended when a diagnosis of the coronary artery disease cannot beclearly established with non invasive tests. During the procedure a local anesthetic is administered to the patient and a thin tube catheter is inserted into a bloodvessel in the groin or arm and then threaded into the heart. Sensors on the catheter tip measure electrical activity, blood pressure and locate blockages. Blood samples can also be taken to check o xygen content. During the procedure, a contrast medium dye can also beinjected into the blood stream to take m o ving x-ray pictures of the heart chambers. This is used to asses the presence of damage to the heart muscle and or to detect the extent, severity and location of atherosclerotic narrowing in the arteries. Taking pictures of the heart and coronary arteries is called angiography.
The results from angiograms may call for percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty PTCA, commonly referred to as angioplasty or coronary artery bypass graft CABG, commonly referred to as the open-heart surgery. Angioplasty is a procedure that opens up the coronary artery narrowing. During the procedure a tiny guide wire is advanced to the coronary artery and through the area of narrowing. A catheter with a de ated balloon on its tip is then guided over the wire to the blockage. The balloon is then in ated compressing the fatty material against the wall of artery. After the balloon catheter is removed, it leaves a larger opening allowing for improved blood ow to the heart. In addition to angioplasty as a treatment of cardiac artery disease, other techniques may also be used in the cardiac catheterization laboratory. Further, a catheterization laboratory may beageneral purpose laboratory or a dedicated laboratory that performs only cardiac related procedures. American College of Cardiology ACC and American Heart Association AHA recommend that a cardiac catheterization laboratory beused only for cardiac related procedures and lists thirty such procedures that may beperformed in a such a laboratory Pepine et al., 1991 . 2.2. Costs and Utilization. A major process innovation was introduced in 1964, when catheterization techniques were used for nonsurgical interventional radiology. Charles Dotter and Melvin Judkins of the University of Oregon, Portland used catheters of varying diameters to open blocked arteries in the leg the technique was later perfected by Judkins. Though their work was initially ignored by surgeons in the U.S., it proved instrumental in the development of the eld of intervention cardiology, in particular of balloon angioplasty. Following the work of Dotter and Judkins, Andreas Gruentzig, a German physician working at University Hospital in Zurich, Switzerland, developed the idea of using balloons to open up the arteries. He performed the rst peripheral human balloon angioplasty in 1974, then improved it by developing a double-lumen catheter tted with a polyvinylchloride balloon in 1975, and presented the results of tests performed on animals to the AHA annual meeting in 1976. This work was still not accepted in the U.S. for another year when at the next AHA annual meeting he presented the results of the rst four coronary angioplasty cases, the rst of which was done in San Francisco with Richard Myler. Thus, it was not until 1978 that the rst PTCA was performed in America. The 1980s were marked with incremental product and process innovations in the use of cardiac catheterization. Cardiac stents were rst used in 1987, and by the late 1980s and early 1990s, many new devices were introduced, including rotational arthrectomy devices, intravascular ultrasound and lasers Mueller & Sanborn, 1995; King, 1998 King, , 1996 Meyer, 1990; Sheldon, 1989; Carlson, 1980 . Between 1979 and 1997 the number of cardiac catheterizations increased by about 300 American Heart Association, 1999 . Figure 1 shows the numberof cardiac catheterization procedures since 1979 as well as the number of hospitals with cardiac catheterization laboratories.
With the rapid growth in both the procedures and the numberof hospitals with catheterization laboratories, concern about the e ciency and e cacy of the procedures also grew. The average cost of an angioplasty PTCA in 1995 was $20,370 American Heart Association, 1999 and the mean charge in 1992 on patients younger than 65 and diagnosed with myocardial infarction was about $10,800 of which 82 of the charges were hospital related, of which about 62 were laboratory charges Scanlon et al., 1999 . Concerns about safety and physician performance as well as possible over utilization due to con icting physician incentives for referral of the procedure led to guide lines and criteria for performance in the laboratories. The Inter Society Commission for Heart Disease was formed in 1969 and was charged with providing guidelines for optimal medical resources. The commission published its reports in 1971, 1976 and then again in 1983 before it was abolished Report of Inter-Society Commission for Heart Disease Resources, 1971; Judkins et al., 1976; Friesinger et al., 1983 . This work was taken up by a joint ad hoc task force from the American College of Cardiology ACC and American Heart Association AHA, which published guidelines for coronary angiography in 1987 revised in 1999, and a report on guidelines for cardiac catheterization and laboratories in 1991 Ross et al., 1987; Scanlon et al., 1999; Pepine et al., 1991 . The guidelines reports provide extensive criteria for referring patients for a catheterization procedure and the numberof recommended procedures. The recommended case-load per physician is a minimum of 150 per year for angiography and minimum of 50 for angioplasty. The recommended case-load for a laboratory is a minimum of 300 in adult laboratories and a minimum of 150 in pediatric laboratories. The reports also state the type of cardiac procedures that can beperformed in cardiac catheterization laboratories about 30, as well as standards for setting up and maintaining catheterization laboratories. The 1991 report recommends space requirements for 19 rooms associated with a catheterization laboratory ranging from soiled utility room to procedure room suggested size is 500 ft 2 .
Where as the joint reports by ACC AHA are only recommendations, most states adopt some variant of these guidelines as state regulations to operate a catheterization laboratory or to approve the building of a new facility where Certi cate Of Need CON laws exist. For instance, a feasibility report on the set up of a new catheterization laboratory would include a case-load of current facilities, as well as projections about the caseload of the existing facilities if the new laboratory was set up. Adhering or staying close to the recommendations for laboratory standards also increases the setup costs.
Like any other technology, the cost of adopting a cardiac catheterization facility varies with time and geographic location. Typically, the cost can be anywhere between $900K to $1.4M in 1999 for the basic equipment which includes the Xray machine. Additionally, if a hospital has to undertake building construction for the laboratory room, the construction costs can beup to $7M more. Construction requirements vary by state. For instance, Pennsylvania requires that the laboratory facility have a minimum of 450 square feet area for the laboratory and 150 square feet minimum area for the attached control room, with at least 3 inches of building material between the laboratory and the control room, and a window between the two rooms. Ohio stipulates that the laboratory area must be at least 600 square feet and the attached control room must beatleast 90 square feet.
In addition to the X-ray machine and the construction costs, various other pieces of equipment are needed in the laboratory. These include, a physiological monitor $90K, pressure injector $35K, external pace maker $7K, de brillator $9K, emergency cart $2K, protection material for the laboratory personal $300 a piece, stainless steel tables $1500, storage cabinets $3K per unit, need about ve of these i n a t ypical laboratory, and nally, lm for recording the x-ray images. Initially, 3 5 mm lm were used to capture the results, but the newer facilities have started using cine less lm to capture the images digitally on a computer. The electronic archiving costs can be up to $350K per year.
Despite the high set up costs of a catheterization laboratory the technology has di used at a rapid pace in hospitals across U.S. see gure 1 . More over, the adoption patterns are such that even neighboring hospitals may adopt the technology, thus decreasing the total cardiac business for each. The simple reason is that cardiology is a lucrative business. The addition of catheterization laboratory not only generates catheterization business, but has a 'halo' e ect: it attracts patients with other cardiac problems as well more physicians to join the hospital, and via these physicians, attracts yet more patients. 
Background and Significance
Over the last few decades, the United States has experienced a marked increase in the use of health services, excess capacity and the early and duplicative adoption of expensive technology in hospitals. These factors have contributed to increasing health care costs which, by 1996, had crossed the one trillion mark albeit, in recent years, the increase in costs has slowed down Levit et al., 1998 Levit et al., , 1996 . The main culprit for these cost increases has been a health care delivery and nance infrastructure that has encouraged hospitals to compete across non-price dimensions Newhouse, 1992; Weisbrod, 1991; Aaron, 1991 . Particularly, a retrospective and cost-based payment system has led the hospitals to compete for patients and physicians by acquiring sophisticated and expensive technologies. According to one report, Consumer Reports, 1992 25 of all hospital revenue is generated from cardiology related procedures and of that 80 comes from just four procedures: cardiac catheterization, angioplasty, b y pass surgery and heart-valve surgery. In addition, pro t margins for cardiac catheterization are 70 and for angioplasty are 37, compared to the overall pro t margins for hospitals at less than 4.
Two important industry responses to rising health care costs have been the enactment of selective contracting in the California legislature in 1982 Melia et al., 1983; Melnick et al., 1989b and the introduction of the Prospective P a yment System PPS by Medicare in Hodgkin & McGuire, 1994 Coulam & Gaumer, 1991 . Both of these institutional responses were aimed at controlling hospital costs.
The introduction of PPS in 1983, switched the cost-based retrospective payment for Medicare patients to a prospective reimbursement system based on the patients' diagnostic related group DRG. This created an incentive for hospitals to maximize their pro ts by minimizing their costs, rather than by maximizing their market share and revenue. Evidence of the e ect of PPS on price and non-price competition has been mixed. Early research showed that the immediate e ect of PPS was a reduction in Medicare inpatient d a ys, length of stay LOS, and discharges, and an increase in outpatient visits Sloan et al., 1988; Hadley et al., 1989 . However, some researchers found that PPS did not have an e ect on some of the hospital utilization variables. DesHarnais et al. 1988 found that PPS did not reduce LOS but decreased Medicare discharges. Hadley et al. 1989 concluded that after the initial years, PPS would have no continued e ect on reducing Medicare inpatient days and LOS, or on increasing ambulatory visits. Similarly, Muller 1993 found that PPS was e ective in reducing hospital utilization during the rst decade of its implementation, but at a reduced rate over time.
On the other hand, under selective contracting by third party payers formally known as Preferred Provider Organizations PPOs, the assumption was that these organizations would force health care providers to give large price discounts in exchange for a constant and high volume of enrollees. In turn, these price discounts given by providers would force them to reduce costs by decreasing excess capacity, avoiding excess use, and by slowing the di usion of expensive technology, perhaps by reducing duplication. Some HMOs that also carry out selective contracting would have a similar e ect. Typically however, HMOs control costs through the use of capitated fees, gate-keeping and by creating nancial incentives for decreased utilization of services Melnick et al., 1989b . Empirical studies that have analyzed data on revenues Melnick et al. 1989a , Zwanziger et al. 1994 , Melnick & Zwanziger 1988 , Melnick et al. 1992 , costs, Melnick et al. 1989a , Zwanziger et al. 1994 , Melnick & Z w anziger 1988 , Melnick et al. 1989b , Robinson & Luft 1987 and utilization Robinson et al. 1988 , Melnick & Zwanziger 1988 ,Chernew 1995 can bebroken into those that use hospital data pre and post 1982-83. The ndings based on data prior to 1982-83 are generally consistent with the hypothesis of non-price competition among hospitals in more concentrated markets. However, the majority o f the post 1982-83 studies that have looked at the e ects of HMO and PPO growth on hospital costs and utilization are largely based on the California experience. These studies provide preliminary evidence that the growth of managed care has indeed spurred price competition among hospitals and that it is most e ective where hospital markets are more concentrated.
While there is extensive empirical evidence on the increase in price competition associated with the growth of managed care, fewer studies provide direct evidence on non-price dimensions, particularly on the e ect on technology adoption. The next few paragraphs summarize the main ndings of some of the studies pertinent to the current research.
Evidence on the Adoption of Technology: The literature on technology adoption in health care suggests that as the insurance market switched from retrospective cost-based reimbursement to prospective price perdischarge payment cost minimizing incentives will force hospitals to adopt cost e cient technologies Weisbrod, 1991; Neumann & Weinstein, 1991; Holmes, 1992; Laubach, 1995 . Theoretical literature argues that scal pressures on hospitals favor the adoption of technologies that reduce direct or indirect costs, rather than those that necessarily enhance technical boundaries Weisbrod, 1991; Moody, 1992; Gelijns & Rosenberg, 1994 . This theoretical literature also suggests that with the growth of managed care, providers will avoid early adoption of expensive and or duplicative technology.
One often cited example of a technology procedure that replaced a more expensive and more invasive procedure is that of laparoscopic cholecystectomy Escarce et al., 1995b ,a . In fact, Steiner et al. 1994 found that patients with managed care contracts had a higher probability of receiving laparoscopic procedure over the open one and, Parente et al. 1996 found that patients receiving treatment from physicians whose majority of patients were enrolled in IPA model HMOs had a 16 greater probability of receiving laparoscopic cholecystectomy. Relatively few studies have looked at the direct e ects of HMO growth or selective contracting on the adoption of technologies. Most of the studies on hospitals' adoption of technologies have explored the consequences of concentrated hospital markets or of introduction of PPS on adoption. These studies have shown that competition among hospitals at least in the pre-PPS, pre-selective contracting era has lead to duplicative and early adoption. Luft et al. 1986 found that for certain technologies, hospitals may compete on nonprice dimensions leading to the existence and early duplication of specialized clinical services. Their results are mixed and depend on the service technology in question. For instance, for mammography, twenty-four hour emergency service and cardiac catheterization, hospitals tended to be duplicative, i.e., if a competing hospital in the local market o ered the service, then the rst hospital was also more likely to adopt and o er this service. However, for cobalt therapy and heart surgery this was not the case. Further, though the number of neighbors o ering mammography increased the likelihood of a hospital also o ering mammography, the number of neighbors per se did not exert any in uence on the probability of a hospital o ering mammography services.
Using data on the di usion of radioisotope facilities between 1952 and 1972 in short-term general and other special hospitals in the U.S., Rapoport 1978 also found evidence of non-price competition among hospitals. Speci cally, he found that 1 hospitals in more competitive environments tended to adopt the innovation earlier, 2 hospitals in more competitive markets tended to adopt more expansive facilities, 3 larger hospitals spent more in the initial phase of adoption than smaller hospitals, 4 if the technology was adopted using funds from speci c donations, then they tended to adopt early but spent less on the initial adoption and, 5 hospitals where physician incomes were tied to the use of technology tended to adopt early and spend more on the adoption compared to hospitals where physicians earned straight salaries. Dranove et al. 1992 used 1983 data on providers of specialized services in California to estimate market e ects on the number of hospitals providing a service in a market. They found that the size of the market population was a signi cant predictor with positive coe cient of the number of hospitals with specialized service for all the eleven study technologies. They also found that increased hospital competition lead to more hospitals providing specialized services though the coe cient was not signi cant for all the services.
Some recent studies have analyzed the direct impact of HMOs on the adoption of technology. Cutler & McClellan 1996 measured the impact of various factors on the share of patients in a hospital receiving angioplasty. Their data set consisted of hospitals from 1984 and 1991 with a bed size larger than 100. Using OLS regression they found the coe cient on the percent of population in a state enrolled in the HMOs was negative and signi cant. In addition, by assuming a proportional hazard for adoption, they estimated the base line hazard semi-parametrically and found that hospitals in areas with high HMO enrollment or with rate regulation are less likely to adopt angioplasty.
Cutler & Sheiner 1997 used state level data various years to examine the relationship between HMO enrollment and di usion of 19 technologies. Their measure for di usion of technology was units per million which they regressed OLS on HMO enrollment and other controls. Generally, they found the coe cient on enrollment was negative and o ered thus a preliminary evidence that managed care has reduced the di usion of medical technologies.
Baker & Spetz 1999 constructed three indices on technology in hospitals using AHA data from 1983 through 1993. A higher value of the index represented the presence of either more services technologies in a hospital or the presence of rarer technologies. They found that until 1986, the mean value of the technology index was higher for hospitals in markets with high HMO presence, but that beyond 1986 the mean index value was higher for hospitals in markets with low HMO presence. Though their results were not statistically signi cant for any of the years other than 1993, their results are indicative of a negative correlation between HMO penetration and the presence of technologies.
To the extent that hospital technologies are not monolithic, this paper complements Baker & Spetz 1999 in that it estimates the impact of HMOs on hospital technologies separately rather than on an aggregate measure of availability of technology. Further, their measure of HMO market share was dichotomous, high and low, whereas in this paper I use continuous values of HMO penetration, and number of operating HMOs. More importantly, the current study di erentiates from Baker & Spetz 1999 in that it estimates the impact of HMO competition on hospital technology.
The studies reviewed provide important insight into the e ects of managed care across various dimensions. Particularly, the impact of managed care on price competition i.e., costs and revenues is positive, and the impact on utilization is mixed. Of particular interest and relevance to this study is the e ect of HMOs on the adoption of technologies. However, on this issue the evidence on the ability o f HMOs to limit the di usion of technology is only preliminary. In addition, these studies are silent on the e ect on adoption and cost in general of increased competition among HMOs. Whereas the growth in HMO penetration has been shown to a large extent to increase price competition among hospitals, the e ect of increased competition among HMOs ought to beconsidered an open question. Will the increasing level of competition among HMOs result in a second medical arms race among hospitals?
Theory, Hypotheses and Model
The health care literature and health policy analysts have often pointed to rapid di usion and the early and duplicative adoption of technologies in hospitals as the main reason for rising health care costs in the U.S. The lynch pin of health policies directed towards slowing down health care costs has been a slowdown in the di usion and duplication of hospital technologies. Advocates of managed care have argued that the di usion of hospital technology will slow d o wn with an increase in managed care activity. Though some explanations exist about how managed care, in particular HMOs and PPOs, will bring about a slowdown in the di usion of technology, there is a lack of clear distinction between di erent notions about how HMOs e ect technology adoption and di usion. As a result, it is sometimes hard to interpret the ndings of the empirical literature that provide correlations between HMO activity and some technology variable in an area.
Baker & Brown 1997 provide a model that predicts the change in the equilibrium number of single service health providers with changes in HMO activity. They predict that the numb e r o f p r o viders will increase with an increase in HMO activity, for services that are preferred by managed care, compared to traditional insurance.
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More important, their model also predicts that the number of single service facilities will always decrease with an increase in managed care activity, if the service is relatively less preferred by managed care than by traditional insurance. Though Baker & Brown 1997 do not speci cally model a hospital's decision-making process, their work exempli es an important notion in the literature: there exist technologies that are relatively less preferred by managed care than by traditional insurance companies and hence, where HMO presence is greater, fewer hospitals with those technology will exist.
Similarly, Baumgardner 1991 classi es new hospital technologies into three classes and considers the adoption of technology under di erent contract types. Baumgardner links the changes in marginal valuation to consumers of the introduction of a technology to the type of insurance contract. On the basis of this assumption he provides testable speci cations that suggest that the probability that a hospital will adopt an innovation will depend upon the fraction of customers covered by a n H M O v ersus a traditional FFS contract.
Another theory regarding the role of HMOs is that they consolidate technology in some hospitals by diverting patients to centers of excellence " Freeland et al., 1987 . The view here is that since some technologies have high sunk and xed costs, it is e cient to have the technology available in some, but not all, hospitals. Under this view, HMOs via their ability to selectively contract, will slow the di usion 2 They stipulate this would happen as long as the loss in pro ts from increased HMO penetration is smaller than the gain in the pro tability from knowledge spillovers and market expansion. of technology by reducing duplication. Thus HMOs rationalize the adoption of technology rather than slow down the adoption of technology by all hospitals. 4.1. Hypotheses. In this section, I explore the assumptions behind each of the two popular notions and more importantly, l a y down testable predictions about each. I also extrapolates the predictions of each theory for di erent levels of HMO competition. Discouraged Adoption: HMOs Discourage The Adoption Of A Technology By All Hospitals. The idea behind this theory is that HMOs tend to view certain technologies as unpro table for their business. Simply put, even though a particular technology may provide some value to patients and hospitals, due to its high cost, the HMOs would rather do without these technologies in their hospital systems. If this were the case, what type of technologies might these be? Suppose a new hospital technology increases the cost of health care but also moves the technology frontiers forward. If it is the case that the marginal cost of the new technology is high but not its xed or sunk cost, the HMO may have an incentive to restrict access to the said service and or technology to the patients via reviews and approvals. However, the HMO may not necessarily try to restrict the adoption of the technology by hospitals. On the other hand, if it were the case that the xed and sunk costs were high, irrespective of the marginal costs, the HMOs may not nd it pro table for the hospitals to adopt the technology in question.
In a cross-sectional study, we would expect that on average, markets where HMO penetration is high, few hospitals would have adopted the high xed high sunk cost technology. Based on models by Baumgardner 1991 or Baker & Brown 1997 , we expect that even if the number of HMOs increases i.e., the HMO market becomes less concentrated, there would still be fewer hospitals with the technology. Thus, given a level of HMO penetration in a market, increased competition among HMOs will not have an a ect on the hospitals' decision to adopt. In other words, given penetration, the number of hospitals with the technology will be the same across markets with high and low HMO competition respectively. In a cross-sectional time series study, one would expect that the time to rst as well as follow-on adoptions will be delayed as a function of HMO penetration, but given penetration level, increased competition among HMOs will have no a ect on the time to rst and follow-on adoptions. Rationalized Adoption: HMOs Rationalize The Adoption Of The Technology. There are two key elements to the rationalized adoption story. Both emerge from assumptions about consumer preferences. The rst, called the 'halo' e ect, is that if all else is the same between two hospitals, then patients prefer to go to the hospital with technology even for other services. Simply put, if everything else is the same, but one hospital has a cathlab and the other does not, patients prefer to get their u injections from the hospital with the cathlab. The second e ect is due to the diminishing marginal value of choice to consumers. Cetris peribus, consumers prefer to enroll in the HMO that provides access to more hospitals. If there are two HMOs 3 These models predict that the probability of adoption by a hospital is a function of HMO penetration but not of HMO concentration. Baumgardner and Baker are relatively silent o n the issue of competition among HMOs. I extrapolate a p ossible extension of their work.
and two hospitals in a market and one HMO contracts with only one hospital and the other HMO contracts with both the hospitals, then the HMO with more contracts will steal all or most of the enrollees from the competing HMO. However, this e ect diminishes if both HMOs have contracts with a su ciently large number of hospitals. Thus, in a market with ten hospitals and two HMOs, if one HMO has contracts with all ten hospitals and the other has contracts with only nine hospitals, it is no longer true that the HMO with only nine contracts will have no enrollees.
Given these two key assumptions about consumer preferences, what might beobserved about the adoption of technology if the HMO penetration is high and HMO competition increases?
Consider a market with only one HMO and multiple hospitals and where the xed cost of technology is high. Per the 'halo' e ect, each hospital would be better o adopting the technology. However, the adopting hospital must cover the xed cost of the technology. 4 If the market share of the adopting hospital is large, it can spread the xed cost of the technology over a greater population and hence o er a lower price per patient to the HMO. The diminishing marginal choice of value to consumers implies that the HMO's demand function is concave in the number of hospitals that it contracts for the technology. Since patients view access to the technology as important, the HMO's pro t increases considerably if it has at least one hospital with the technology but the pro t does not increase by a s m uch if it has two hospitals with the technology. Thus, the HMO would contract with only one hospital for the technology the lowest bidder, or if all the bids are equal then randomly pick one hospital and given the HMOs action, in equilibrium only one hospital will adopt the technology.
Next, consider a case when there are two HMOs in the market and still only two hospitals. Per the 'halo' e ect, each hospital is still better o adopting the technology. Since consumers place a positive value on the choice of providers when selecting an HMO, the HMOs face a prisoner's dilemma with positive p a y o s in deciding whether to contract with the second hospital for the technology: each is strictly better o by contracting with the second hospital for the provision of technology regardless of the actions of the competing HMO, but both are worse o if both contract with two hospitals since the relative market share remains the same and each hospital increases the price perpatient to cover the xed cost. The solution would bethat both the HMOs would be willing to accept the contract from two hospitals, and in equilibrium, both hospitals will adopt the technology. Increased competition in the HMO market leads to the duplication of technology.
Finally, consider a market where there are not a few hospitals two but many say twenty. However, due to the diminishing marginal value to the consumers when choosing between two HMOs, the consumers place less value on the relative c hoice of providers if the choice set is su ciently large, the additional payo to HMOs from contracting with another hospital falls. The additional cost implied by technology adoption is xed. Thus, beyond some threshold, an HMO will no longer nd it pro table to contract with a hospital, even if its rival were to do so. If an HMO 4 The price per patient that it charges the HMO must be atleast as great as the long run average total cost.
Discouraged Adoption
Rationalized Adoption Technology still di using contracts with the thirteenth hospital given that the competitor has contracted with only twelve, the contracting HMO will not beable to steal away the enrollees of the competitor. Further, the price perpatient for the HMOs will behigher for all the hospitals.
In summary then, we should expect that if the HMO penetration is high and as the number of HMOs increases, hospitals are more likely to adopt the technology, i.e., marginal probability of the rst and follow-on adoption with respect to the number of HMOs in the market will be positive. However, once the technology is well di used, increased competition among HMOs will not further increase the probability of adoption. Infact, if the technology is well di used, HMOs are less likely to compete on non-price dimensions such as contracting with more hospitals and as the number of HMOs further increases they will compete on prices. This, in turn, can decrease the probability of follow-on adoption by hospitals in markets where technology is already well di used.
Testable hypotheses are summarized in table 1 .
Empirical Model. The unit of analysis is individual hospital level data for
short-term general community hospitals from AHA's Annual Survey of Hospitals. I measure hospital competition as the number of hospitals in the hospital's 'market' both, total number of hospitals as well as hospitals with cathlabs, where the hospital market is de ned as the 24-mile radius using the hospitals' ZIP codes. The 24-mile radius market de nition has been used before in other studies Luft et al., 1986; Robinson & Luft, 1987; Robinson et al., 1988 and will be used here as well to facilitate comparison of results with prior research see Figure 2 . Note two features of the hospital market as de ned here i The numberof hospital markets will be as many as the number of hospitals where the hospital markets will be overlapping, and ii hospital market variables such the number of competing hospitals or the hospital Her ndahl index will not be symmetric across hospitals. Whereas it can beargued that hospitals compete on a local level and hence 24-mile radius may be adequate to capture the hospital competition HMOs compete for enrollees over a larger geographic area. Thus, HMO penetration and competition measures are used at Health Services Area HSA level as de ned by Makuc et al. 1991a,b . Brie y, Makuc et al. 1991a Makuc et al. ,b used 1988 Medicare hospital discharge data to de ne an HSA as a group of counties such that the ow of hospital patients across HSAs is They developed an algorithm to cluster counties into a group so that the distance between counties is minimized, where the distance is de ned as 1 -total ow of hospital ows between the two counties divided by the total stays in the county with fewer stays. Based on patient ows, HSAs provide a better measure of HMO markets compared to counties or Metropolitan Statistical Areas MSA.
Discrete Time Hazard Model: The nature of the selected technology, cardiac catheterization, is such that it has a considerably large proportion of sunk costs, so it is assumed that the hospitals will not be un-adopting" a technology once it has been adopted. Further, the exact timing of a hospital's decision to adopt the technology is not known, we only learn if a hospital adopted the technology within a time period a year. Thus, a hospital's decision to adopt can bemodeled as a discrete time single spell event.
The usual technique of estimating the probability that a hospital rm will adopt a technology in a time period is to estimate the discrete time hazard model for a single spell event here, adoption Allison, 1984 . The typical speci cation in a discrete time hazard model is given by taking the log transform of the probability to adopt as where X it are the time varying co-variates and d t are the collection of dummy v ariables one for each year allowing for the hazard rate to change autonomously with time.
Using maximum likelihood estimators, I estimate the following model: In the model above, y it = 1 if hospital i adopts catheterization in year t; X it are the hospital characteristics, X i 0 it are the hospital market characteristics based on the 24-mile radius de nition, X j it are the market characteristics of the HMO market j at time t in which hospital i is located and are the parameters to be estimated.
The vector of hospital characteristics X1 it includes the following variables: i type of control over hospital for-pro t vs. not-for-pro t, and ii hospital a liations, i.e., the teaching status of the hospital. The variable X2 it-1 is a dummy variable indicating the existence of other related technologies in the previous period. Speci cally, it is a dummy v ariable indicating if the hospital had an open heart surgery unit last year.
The HMO market characteristics X3 j it include the following variables: i HMO penetration, and ii HMO competition proxied by the number of unique HMOs operating in the HSA.
The hospital market variables X4 i 0 it include: i the level of hospital competition proxied by the numberof other hospitals in the 24-mile radius and ii regulatory measures, such as CON, in the state of the hospital. Similarly, the variable X5 i 0 it-1 is the number of competing hospitals within the 24-mile radius that had already adopted cardiac catheterization by the previous year. Other desirable economic and demographic information at the hospital market level includes the race, sex and age composition of the population, and measures of poverty. However, since not all of these variables are available at the block and tract level for all the inter-census years, the construction of population estimates at 24-mile radius is not possible, and hence these factors are controlled for at the next higher level, i.e., the county level. Thus, X4 i 0 it also includes the following variables at county level: total population, percent of male and female population over 65 and their squares and aid to families with dependent children AFDC.
Since the hazard function may increase or decrease over time, it makes sense to include a set of dummy v ariables P t d t in the equation above, thus allowing for any variation in the hazard function. One shortcoming of the hospital level analysis used here and especially the de nition of the hospital market is that though it allows for the computing of the hazard rate, it does not directly provide information on the time to rst and follow-on adoption in the market. Note that the hazard rate computed here is the probability that any given hospital will adopt while controlling for other e ects such as X4 i 0 it and X5 i 0 it-1 . Almost by de nition, an estimate of the time to rst and followon adoption requires analysis at the market level, where the markets should not be overlapping.
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Since the primary interest here is the e ect of HMO penetration and 5 An obvious alternative is to perform the analysis at the level of the market with repeated events, where the repeated event is not that a given hospital re-adopts but rather the rst time a hospital competition numberof HMOs on the time to rst and follow-on adoption, I introduced the interaction terms I ji 0 itt,1 = X5 i 0 it-1 *S j it in the model, where the vector S j it = N j it , P e n j it is the numberof HMOs and the HMO penetration in market j at time t. Note that the introduction of these interaction terms allows for the recovery of the probability of rst and follow-on adoption. The AHA survey annually collects detailed information on hospital characteristics from nearly all U.S. acute care hospitals and has a response rate of about 90. This survey includes information on whether or not a hospital o ers a particular service technology. Though the survey provides information on the availability o f a particular technology service it does not report frequency of usage.
The HMO data, provided by Wholey et al. 1995 , is based on InterStudy Censuses 1985 to 1995, InterStudy reports on MSAs served by HMOs, and GHAA Directories 1988 to 1991. The enrollment measure that they construct prorates the enrollment of an HMO over all the counties served by that HMO, using county populations as prorating weights. The information on an HMO's enrollment in an MSA comes from the survey report by InterStudy 1994, 1995. Thus, in their measure, if an HMO operates in two counties with populations of 100,000 and 200,000 then 1 3 of the HMO's enrollment would be reported in the smaller of the two counties and 2 3 would bereported in the larger one. These HMO enrollment measures correct for enrollment reported in the county of the head o ce location of the individual HMOs.
in a market adopts, the second time a hospital in the same market adopts and so on. Such methodology in turn requires that markets be non overlapping. The use of MSA's and or counties as the non-overlapping hospital market has been criticized in the literature as being too large to properly control for hospital competition.
6 By estimating 's, the predicted probabilities can be computed at di erent v alues of the covariates. Thus holding other covariates at their mean value, the number of HMOs at n" and the number of competing hospitals that had adopted the technology in the previous period equal to zero, provides the probability that a hospital adopts given that no one in its market has already adopted and the number of HMOs is n". This is the probability o f rst adoption given the number of HMOs. Similarly, setting the number of hospitals that adopted in the previous period equal to one provides the probability o f second adoption given the number of HMOs.
Hospitals with Catheterization Labs in 1995
Low Penetration High Penetration Low Competition A = 428 n 1 =1903 B = 224 n 2 =545 High Competition C = 120 n 3 =317 D = 929 n 4 =1657 where n i represents the numberof hospitals in that category Table 2 gives the number of hospitals with cardiac catheterization laboratories in 1995 broken by high and low number of HMOs and HMO penetration.
By converting the numbers into percentages proportions, and then testing the difference in proportions for signi cance, the following two n ull hypotheses are rejected in favor of the alternative h ypotheses:
Null : A n 1 -C n 3 = 0; Alternative: A n 1 C n 3
Null : B n 2 -D n 4 = 0; Alternative: B n 2 D n 4 While the results of these tests provide preliminary support for the rationalized adoption" theory over the discouraged adoption" theory, they are not completely consistent with either. Both theories suggest that A B i.e., markets with higher penetration will have fewer hospitals with a catheterization laboratory but the null hypothesis of A = B is not rejected. Further, these numbers can be misleading because they do not control for other variables such as the size of the market, population over 65, state laws or teaching status etc. The main analysis controls for such variables using a parametric approach and testing the hypotheses given in table 1 .
The descriptive statistics from the full panel are provided in table 3 and are grouped by hospitals-years that operated a catheterization laboratory or not. Hospitalyears in which a catheterization laboratory was not present 40,781, operated in areas where HMO penetration, on average was 8.48 and numberof HMOs operating in the area was 4.82. These same hospitals had about 11.12 neighbors of which 4.1 possessed catheterization laboratory in the previous year. Also, about only 3 of these hospitals had an open heart surgery unit available in the previous year. By comparison, hospitals-years when catheterization laboratories were present 15,083, the HMO penetration in the area was 14.65, and the numberof operating HMOs was 8.5. These hospitals had about 21.9 neighbors of which about 10.25 already possessed catheterization laboratories by the previous year. Also, about 57.1 of the hospitals with catheterization laboratories also operated an open heart surgery unit during the previous year. In fact, if a null is formulated that as penetration increases then so does the number of hospitals with catheterization laboratories, then that null is not rejected either. The coe cients on teaching status and poverty measures were both signi cant and had the 'correct' signs. The coe cient on for-pro t status was also signi cant but negative. The for-pro t status of a hospital reduces the probability of adoption by 0.0063.
Whereas the coe cient on population is signi cant and positive, as expected, the coe cients on percent of male population over 65 and square of this variable are confusing. The marginal probability at the mean for percent of males over 65 is -0.0164, indicating that a 1 p o i n t increase from the mean value of percent of males over 65 about 5 leads to a .0164 decrease in the probability o f adoption. Since heart disease is the numberone cause of death among males over 65, and a large number of cardiac catheterization procedures are performed on this population group, the negative sign on marginal probability is unexpected.
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There are two possible explanations for this. One, since the model captures the probability that a hospital will adopt a catheterization laboratory during a year, given that it has not already adopted in a previous year, all hospital observations in the data set were excluded that had adopted prior to 1986. Thus, it could be that areas with a large proportion of the male population over 65 adopted so early that they are completely censored from the data set. To c heck this intuition, I estimated a simple logit for the base line year of 1986 where the binary dependent variable was not if a hospital adopted in 1986 but rather if the hospital had a catheterization laboratory in 1986 thus eliminating the possible censor bias. The estimates were similar, i.e., even on a simple logit in 1986, the marginal e ect of the male population over 65 was still negative. The other possibility is that though the marginal e ect at the mean is negative, due to the quadratic nature of the speci cation, the marginal e ect will be positive at some higher level of percent of population over 65. The turning point turns out to beat about 10. Thus, only if the population over 65 is 10 or more, then a 1 point increase in population over 65 will increase the probability of adoption, but a 1 point increase if the population over 65 is less than 10 will decrease the probability of adoption.
The coe cient on HMO penetration is negative but not signi cant at the usual 5 level P -value is .1021 but the coe cient on the interaction of penetration and numberof neighbors with catheterization laboratories in the previous period is signi cant and positive.
To capture the non-linear e ects of the competition within HMOs, a dummy v ariable indicating whether there are zero HMOs in the local market was also included in the model speci cation. The coe cient on the dummy is negative and signi cant 8 To i n v estigate this aspect further, the model was re-estimated by excluding the variable on the number of neighbors with catheterization laboratories in the previous period from the speci cation. The coe cient on the number of neighbors then became positive and signi cant. The two results combined indicate that the overall results are consistent with the medical arms race literature.
For instance, in 1992, a total of 1,028K procedures were performed of which 47.3 were performed on population over 65 and of the total, 25.9 were on males over 65 which represented only 4.67 of the total population in that year. and the coe cient on the number of HMOs is positive and signi cant. However, the interaction term between number of HMOs and numberof neighbors in the previous period with catheterization laboratories is positive and signi cant. It is clear that the e ect of the number of HMOs is signi cant, but the direction of this e ect is not apparent by looking at the signs of the parameters alone. To gure out the direction of the e ect, a column of marginal probabilities is included in the table. The marginals are computed at the mean. Thus, at the mean values, if the number of operating HMOs increases by 1, then cetrus peribus, the probability of adoption increases by +.0006 and if penetration increases by 1, probability of adoption decreases by .0001 though the e ect of an increase in penetration is not statistically signi cant. Table 4 of an increase in the number of HMOs was computed at the mean values, particularly when numberof HMOs and the numberof neighbors with catheterization laboratories in the previous period was about 5. Since the coe cient on the interaction term between neighbors with catheterization laboratories and number of HMOs is negative and smaller by about an order of magnitude, compared to the coe cient on the number of HMOs, the marginal probability will become negative when the number of neighbors with a catheterization laboratory in the previous period is some value slightly greater than ten. Figure 4 plots the probability of adoption as a function of the number of HMOs all other variables at the mean, given the number of hospitals that had already adopted in the previous period. The graph shows that the a ect of increased competition among HMOs proxied by the number of HMOs is to increase the probability of rst as well as follow-on adoption as long as less than 12 hospitals have adopted the technology. Further, the a ect of presence of exactly one HMO compared to no HMOs is to always increase the probability of adoption. As the number of HMOs in market increases, the probability of rst adoption as well as of duplication increases, but in markets where there are already high levels of duplication, increases in the numberof HMOs reduce the probability of further duplication.
Based on these estimates and the slope of the probabilities as shown in Figure 4 , all three hypotheses about the marginal probability of adoption rst and follow-on are consistent with the alternative hypotheses and the rst two hypotheses of discouraged adoption" are rejected. Thus, the estimates from the model are supportive of rationalized adoption" i.e., that HMOs rationalize the adoption of technology. Marginals at the mean are computed as: P*1-P* @X @ X . F or the variable HSANOHMO, @X @ X = 2 + 8 LNT 1 where 2 is the coe cient on HSANOHMO i.e., 0.047, 8 is the coe cient on the interaction term HSANOHMO * LNT1 i.e., -.004 and LNT1 at the mean is 5.810. Since P at smaple mean is .02373, hence the marginal probability for HSANOHMO is 0.02372*1-. Table 4 . Discrete Time Hazard Rate Model probability is computed when the number of HMOs is 5 and penetration is about 10. The error bars show the 95 con dence interval. The marginal probability is positive for rst and follow-on adoption until the 13th. adoption and is negative is less than zero and signi cant in markets where technology is already well di used. Based on these results, null hypotheses for discouraged adoption" are rejected in favor of the alternative hypotheses for rationalized adoption". Similarly, marginal probabilities and 95 con dence intervals were also computed for smaller markets, i.e., where the total number of hospitals was ve graphs not shown. As before, the marginal probability was positive and signi cant over the entire range of rst, second,... fth adoption. Thus, in both small and large hospital markets, marginal probability of adoption with respect to the number of HMOs is in favor of the 'rationalized adoption' theory. 5.5. Endogeneity. The DTHR model above assumes that all variables in f a b o v e are exogenous and that there is no measurement error in the explanatory variables. However, it is likely that some unobserved local market e ects that may b e c hanging over time e ect both, the hospitals' decision to adopt the technology of interest, and the HMOs' decision to enter the market and hence HMO penetration level and the level of competition among HMOs. Since the primary interest of this study is to measure the impact of HMOs on the probability of adoption, failure to account for the simultaneity problem may lead to biased results. For instance, Baker 1996 and Baker & Spetz 1999 argue that markets with more aggressive practices may be more Neighbors with CathLabs Figure 5 . Marginal Probability attractive to HMO entry as well as more likely to adopt technology. Thus, in the model above, vector S j it = N j it , P e n j it is likely to beendogenous. If so, the results may b e biased up.
The standard technique to deal with such Endogeneity problems as well as measurement errors is through the use of instrumental variables IV, if they are available. Since the duration model used in this study is nonlinear, a standard IV approach is not applicable. However, Cutler & McClellan 1996 suggest using the predicted values of the endogenous variable hospital competition in their case as long as the identifying assumption could bemade that the average value of the covariates in an area as a whole does not a ect a given hospital's decision to acquire the technology once we account for the hospital characteristics. Since it is not clear if such an assumption holds true in the case at hand, the model needs to be speci ed as a multiequation model and all parameters need to be estimated simultaneously using the full information maximum likelihood FIML estimator. The FIML estimator requires that the joint distribution of the error terms for all the equations be speci ed.
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The 11 Due to the presence of the interaction terms and the dummy when the number of HMOs is zero, there are ve endogenous variables: HMO penetration, Number of HMOs; Dummy when the number of HMOs is zero, and the interaction of HMO penetration and number of HMOs with the number of hospitals in a local market that had adopted catheterization laboratories in the previous period. Thus, in this case, FIML estimator would require specifying the joint distribution of the error term in six equations.
multi-equation structural model can bewritten as where, P e n j it is the HMO penetration in market j; W j it,1 Y j it,1 is the weighted sum average or percentage of the hospitals that have adopted the technology in HMO market j. The vector Z j it are the observable variables that e ect the HMO penetration level in market j at time t.
Since the objective of this paper is to test the hypotheses by testing the sign of the estimates rather than provide very accurate estimates of the parameters I estimated linear versions of the equations 3. In particular, a linear probability model was estimated using OLS and IV. The results from the linear probability model, with and without the instrumental variables are given in Table 5 .
In previous works where linear models were employed, Chernew 1995 suggested using strictness of state regulation and Baker & Spetz 1999 suggested using the number of large businesses in the county of hospital as the instruments for HMO penetration. Since both seem plausible, equations 3 were estimated using both sets of instruments. The instruments used are the numberof large businesses as well as the strictness of state regulations. The strictness of state regulation is measured by the presence of the so-called any willing provider" AWP and freedom of choice" FOC laws, as they apply to HMOs regarding physicians, hospitals and pharmacies. Thus, a total of seven instruments were used -number of businesses with hundred or more employees in the HSA, three dummy v ariables indicating if the state has an AWP law for HMOs regarding i physicians, ii hospitals, or iii pharmacies, and three dummy v ariables indicating if the state has a FOC law for HMOs regarding i physicians, ii hospitals, and iii pharmacies. In addition, interactions of these seven basic instruments with the variable for the numberof hospitals with catheterization laboratories in the previous period as well as the interactions of the six state laws with each other were also used. Thus, the vector Z j it consists of 26 variables and the reduced form single equation model has ve right hand side endogenous variables. Reults from the rst-stage" of an equivalent two stage least squares are given in the appendix. The appendix also provides the F-test values the hypothesis that the coe cients on the 26 instruments are all zero. The F-test values are large and so the null hypothesis about the coe cients being zero can be rejected thus providing some empirical support for using these instruments
The results from the IV estimates are largely consistent with results from DTHRM. Whereas the marginal e ect of HMO penetration is negative, it is not signi cant but the marginal a ect of number of HMOs is still positive and signi cant. However, the coe cient on the dummy for 1 HMO is not signi cant any more. Though the IV estimates may still be biased, they are consistent. Hence, as before, null hypotheses where the rate of change of probability of rst and follow-on adoption with respect y Signi cant a t 5 l e v el; yy Signi cant at 10 level Table 5 . Estimates from Linear Probability Models to number of HMOs is negative is rejected in favor of the alternative hypotheses supporting the rationalized adoption. The remaining non-HMO related variables have the same results as from the discrete time hazard rate model. Strength of the instruments was tested by performing joint F-tests for the instruments in the rst stage" of an equivalent t w o stage least squares model, i.e., where the left hand side dependent variable is one of the endogenous HMO related variables. The F-values were large greater than 140 6. Summary and Conclusions Advocates of managed care have argued that the di usion of hospital technology will be slowed down with an increase in managed care activity. This paper measures the impact of HMO penetration and competition on the adoption of one such costly technology: cardiac catheterization.
Based on the existing literature, this paper di erentiates between two theories of the e ects of managed care on hospital technology: i HMOs discourage the adoption of technology by all hospitals, and ii HMOs rationalize the adoption of technology in hospitals. These theories are di erentiated by stating competing hypotheses regarding the e ect of HMO penetration and the e ect of HMO competition on a hospital's probability to adopt, as well as the time to the rst and follow-on adoptions in a given hospital market. The hypotheses are tested by specifying a discrete time hazard rate model for adoption and using the data on cardiac catheterization, HMO penetration and competition measures.
Results from a multinomial logit speci cation show that whereas HMO penetration does not e ect the probability of adoption, a hospital is more likely to adopt cardiac catheterization facilities as the competition within HMOs increases. Further, the results indicate that the probability of follow-on adoption i.e., adoption by the k th hospital given that k-1 of it's neighbors have already adopted by the last period also increases as the HMO market becomes increasingly competitive. In large markets with about 20 hospitals, the rate of change of probability of adoption with respect to the number of HMOs in the market is positive and signi cant for the rst seven adoptions, and is negative and signi cant after the sixteenth adoption. In smaller markets, the marginal probability of adoption is always positive and signi cant. The ndings reported here are also consistent with the medical arms race MAR literature in that a given hospital's probability to adopt increases with the number of neighboring hospitals that have already adopted the technology in the previous period. Finally, the main results are robust to alternative speci cations. Linear probability models, with and without instruments for possibly endogenous variables for penetration and numberof HMOs, yield similar results.
While the main focus of this paper is to di erentiate and test the two competing theories of technology adoption, it is possible to get rough estimates of how much HMO competition contributed to increasing to health care cost. Suppose we hold HMO output constant but reduce competition so that only one HMO were to account for the entire HMO penetration in any market with one or more HMOs. How many fewer adoptions would have taken place?
We do this for markets where technology is still di using. In markets where technology was still di using, i.e., ten or fewer neighbors had already adopted the technology, there were 566 adoptions compared to 748 total adoptions in all markets. In these markets, the average probability of adoption was .0175846 and the risk set was 31965 i.e., hospital-years between 1986 and 1995 composing of hospitals that had not adopted by 1985. Multiplying 31965 by .0175846 gives 562 as the expected number of adoptions, a number remarkably close to the observed 566 adoptions. This suggesting that the instruments are not weak". For more details on testing for weak instruments, see Staiger & Stock 1997 . implies that, in order to estimate how many adoptions would have taken place had there been only one HMO per market, assuming a binomial distribution for numberof adoptions may not provide a bad approximation. 13 Thus, in a simple simulation, the probability of adoption was recomputed using the estimated regression coe cients and all the data values at their original value except the numberof HMOs were set equal to one. The probability of adoption decreased to 0.0148754, which implies that had there been only one HMO in each of these markets, only 475 31965:0148754 hospitals would have adopted, a decrease of about 86 adoptions. Multiplying this by the typical cost of a cath lab adoption approximately $6 million, and the increase in health care costs amounts to about half a billion dollars due to HMO competition from this technology alone.
This estimate is a lower bound for the true decrease in the number of adoptions since no correction was made to account for the fact that the adoptions are not truly independent: If one less hospital adopts in a market due to fewer HMOs, then in the next period, the neighboring hospitals would have one less neighborwith the technology and hence the total probability of adoption for each of the neighbors would further decrease.
14 Whether the increased competition among HMOs increases the probability of rst and follow-on adoption for other technologies remains to beseen. If the results reported here for cardiac catheterization are typical for other expensive technologies with high sunk high xed costs as well, then the implication is that increased competition among HMOs limits their ability to reduce health care costs that accrue due to early and wasteful duplication of technology by hospitals. These ndings, combined with the earlier research which reports that managed care does reduce hospital costs, may mean that the key to slowing the growth in health care costs may not bejust to manage competition within hospitals, but also managing competition within managed care, speci cally within health maintenance organizations and preferred provider organizations.
13
This assumption is technically not correct. A random variable Y where Y is the number of successes observed during n trial requires that each trial be independent. That is not so in the current model. If a hospital adopts the technology, its neighbors are also more likely to adopt in the next period.
14 The second order correction to the estimate can be made as follows: Separate the data by years and for each y ear generate Bernoulli outcomes 1 for adoption and 0 for non-adoption with the probability of success .0175846. Next, for each y ear, count the number of neighbors that have adopted i.e., the Bernoulli successes plus the number of adopters in 1985. Use this gure to recompute the number of neighbors with catheterization laboratories in the previous year and then simulate to estimate the new probability of adoption.
This approach w as not taken due to the high cost of computing time. In order to compute how many of the neighbors have adopted the technology, a n n contingency matrix must be created for every year where the i,j entry of the matrix a 1 or a 0 indicates if j is a neighborto i and n is the number of hospitals in the U.S. in that year. This matrix must then by m ultiplied with a n 1 v ector which indicates that the ith. hospital has a catheterization laboratory. The matrix multiplication provides the number of neighbors that a hospital has with catheterization laboratory. This method was used in the main analysis to compute the number of neighbors and neighbors with catheterization laboratories and took the bulk of the computing time.
7. Appendix Table 6 provides joint F-test results from the rst-stage" of an equivalent two stage least squares regression. The dependent variable is one of the endogenious variables numberof HMOs, HMO penetration, dummy if numberof HMOs is zero, the interaction of number of HMOs with neighbors in the previous period with a cathlab, and the interaction of HMO penetration measure with numberof neighbors in the previous period with a cath lab. The joint F-tests reported in Table 3 .6 are only for the extra instruments used in the linear probability with instruments model and not for all the instruments. There are seven extra instruments plus their interactions with each other, making a total of twenty seven extra instruments used in the linear probablity with instruments model.
In addition, tables 7 to 11 provide the compelete results from rst-stage" regressions for all the endogenious variables. 
